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ABSTRACT 
This article examines the reception of Chin refugees from Myanmar in Mizoram State in north-
east India through the framework of boundaries and belonging.  Strong historical, cultural and 
ethnic connections between Chin and Mizo might suggest a strong claim to belonging.  This 
has been true to some extent but the reception of Chin in Mizoram has also been shaped by 
perceived otherness. This article explores the co-existing discourses of Chin as other/brother 
in relation to processes of boundary-making, boundary-policing and boundary-manipulation.  
It argues that these contrasting narratives illustrate a dynamic relationship between national 
borders and boundaries of belonging which speak to deeper truths about the legitimacy of the 
nation-state and the role of place, politics and identity in the construction of insiders and others. 
This case study generates several conclusions of wider relevance to refugee studies, namely 
the flexibility of perceptions of belonging, the possibility of deliberately reshaping perceptions 
of belonging, and the existence of multiple, overlapping identities (i.e. citizenship, faith, 
ethnicity and culture) which are accorded different weight and value at different times.  
 
Introduction  
Refugee reception is often analysed as primarily determined by national and international law 
and policy. However, laws and policies are enacted in societies and can be reinforced or 
undermined by local realities. For example, national policies of rejection can be subverted by 
local generosity, while a national policy of tolerance towards refugees can be undermined by 
local hostility and discrimination.2 Of course, the range of local responses is not restricted to 
hospitality or hostility. Refugees are quintessential outsiders in a society whose non-belonging 
is inherent in their refugee status and lack of citizenship, but their survival also depends on 
                                                          
1 This article was presented at the workshop on InterAsian Connections at Seoul National University in April 
2016 and the University of Oxford’s Asia Studies Centre public seminar series in April 2017. I am grateful to 
the participants at both events, to Elaine Ho and Cabeiri Robinson for editorial support, to the anonymous 
reviewers for their detailed suggestions, and to Naomi Creutzfeldt for commenting on multiple drafts. I would 
also like to thank everyone who participated in the research and facilitated my time in Aizawl and Mizoram. 
This research was funded by the John Fell Fund and by Ockenden International during my tenure as the Joyce 
Pearce Junior Research Fellow in Refugee Studies at the University of Oxford (2012-2015).  
2 An example of the former is the Acehnese fishermen who rescued Rohingya refugees refused entry by the 
governments of Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia (see McNevin, this issue).  
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putting down roots: securing a place to live and work, learning to communicate in a foreign 
language. Thus, belonging is a negotiated condition forged between refugees and their host 
communities. The nature of this process is an important window into the lived conditions of 
forced migrants, in terms of who is permitted to belong, what belonging looks like and how it 
can be achieved or promoted. It also has important implications for refugee law and policy, in 
(for example) understanding how and why local reception varies for different refugee 
populations.  This is relevant to every aspect of refugees’ lives, though is perhaps particularly 
salient for durable solutions planning, as local acceptance of refugees’ claim to belonging is 
central to the success of resettlement, repatriation and local integration.  
 
Belonging has been a central research question in migration studies for some time, along with 
related topics such as integration, assimilation and multiculturalism (Castles and Davidson 
2000, Yuval-Davis 2006, Delanty et al 2008). It has been less prominent in refugee studies, 
only emerging as a core research theme relatively recently (Hovil 2016, Brun et al 2017). One 
reason for this may be that refugee studies has by definition approached refugee status as a 
privileged analytical category and in doing has arguably neglected to recognise refugees as 
possessing multiple identities and communities of belonging, related to (e.g.) faith, culture, 
religion, language, gender and others. As will be argued below, these identities are often more 
influential in shaping local reception and boundaries of belonging than the universal category 
of “refugee”.   
 
This article recognises belonging as an interaction between place, politics and identity and 
draws on borderland studies, identity studies and refugee studies to examine the significance 
of “boundaries and belonging” for Chin refugees in the northeast Indian state of Mizoram. 
Boundaries have been a central concept in identity studies for several decades, as an approach 
that recognises community as relational, evolving and constructed by cognitive distinctions 
between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. In Barth’s famous phrase (1969:15), “the critical focus of 
investigation from this point of view becomes the ethnic boundary that defines the group, not 
the cultural stuff that it encloses.” The boundaries constructing identity are not only cognitive 
but can also be territorial. Mizoram has two international borders (with Myanmar to the east 
and Bangladesh to the south) and three borders with other northeast Indian States (Assam, 
Manipur and Tripura). As with many borderlands, Mizoram is simultaneously a space of 
international connection and of highly localised differentiation of identities and entitlements. 
This article focuses on Mizoram’s border with Myanmar, and therefore with Chin State. 
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Mizoram and Chin State are small and ethnically distinct sub-states which have considerably 
more in common with each other than with their respective ‘parent’ nations of India and 
Myanmar. Strong historical, cultural and ethnic connections between Chin and Mizo might 
suggest that those arriving would easily integrate into Mizoram. This has been true to some 
extent but reception of Chin in Mizoram has also been shaped by their perceived otherness. 
They have been resented, rejected and blamed for a host of social problems, including the 
production and sale of alcohol and drugs. On several occasions low-level resentment has 
escalated to mass pushbacks across the border to Myanmar. Alongside these processes of 
othering is a parallel discourse that recognises the Chin as co-ethnics and kin, a discourse that 
in Mizoram is often framed around pan-ethnic identity, typically Zo. This discourse exists as a 
counterpoint to prejudice and scapegoating and has arguably afforded the Chin a unique status 
in Mizoram, as outsiders who simultaneously have a claim to belonging.   
 
The relationship between Mizo-Chin has not evolved in a neat trajectory – reality rarely does 
– but this case study provides a number of valuable insights nevertheless. Responses to Chin 
in Mizoram illustrate a dynamic relationship between national borders and boundaries of 
belonging, and the changing contours of this relationship speak to deeper truths about the 
legitimacy of the nation-state and the role of place, politics and identity in the construction of 
insiders and others (Migdal 2004; Van Houtum and Van Naerssen 2002). The analysis 
presented here also reinforces central insights on the nature of boundaries and belonging, 
including that belonging is flexible (and therefore malleable), identities are multiple (and 
therefore accorded different weight and value at different times), and that the boundaries of 
both are constantly under negotiation.  
 
Methodology  
 
This article is drawn from fieldwork conducted in Mizoram during July 2014 and June, July 
and August 2015. I conducted semi-structured and unstructured interviews with 125 people in 
Aizawl and in southern Mizoram (Lai Autonomous District and Mara Autonomous District). 
Related fieldwork was conducted in New Delhi and Kuala Lumpur between 2013 and 2015, 
and in Chin State in December 2014. Interviews were recorded with the consent of the 
participant, or written notes were taken when this was the preference of the interviewee. All 
interviews were conducted in English or with the assistance of an interpreter. I used a number 
of interpreters to access different communities.  
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Research with refugee populations is often sensitive and this is certainly the case in Mizoram. 
As a white, Western, female researcher, I was unmistakably an outsider and was treated with 
great hospitality – and some suspicion. My research topic and ability to be objective was 
repeatedly challenged: “What do you want to do in Mizoram? And do you think that you will 
get the truth? Do you think that people will tell you honestly, on both sides?”3 As with any 
other qualitative research project, I have tried to “get the truth” by seeking out and weighing 
up as many sources of information as possible. My multi-sited fieldwork had advantages in 
triangulating information, as many refugees in New Delhi and Kuala Lumpur had lived in 
Mizoram at some point or have friends and family who had done so. I could discuss conditions 
in Mizoram with people who were not invested in that context and perhaps were more able to 
speak freely. Equally, I was able to build trust with interviewees in Mizoram by discussing 
conditions in Kuala Lumpur, Delhi, Chin State and Myanmar. I also used these wider networks 
to identify interviewees and research participants in Mizoram, and to find a research assistant 
and interpreter who was Mizo by birth but had worked with and was trusted by the Chin 
community in Mizoram.    
 
My framing of this as a “refugee” situation also requires some explanation, as this is not how 
the Chin in Mizoram are defined in national or state law, or indeed at the local level. India has 
not ratified the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and has no domestic refugee law. 
In the absence of a formal legal framework, India’s responses to refugees are ad hoc and often 
nationality-specific. For Myanmar refugees, status determination is conducted by UNHCR in 
New Delhi and the Indian government has repeatedly refused status determination in Mizoram. 
The formal status of the Chin in Mizoram is therefore not as refugees but undocumented 
migrants. I analyse them as “refugees” notwithstanding, in recognition that refugee status is 
declaratory rather than constitutive (UNHCR 2011, H28). Most Chin in Mizoram migrated 
during military rule in Myanmar, when ethnic and religious persecution was widespread and 
when many, if not all, likely fulfilled the 1951 Convention criteria for refugee status. Since 
2011, Myanmar has been engaged in political reform, including the election of a government 
led by the National League for Democracy. However, conditions in the country cannot yet be 
said to meet the fundamental and enduring change required to establish “ceased circumstances” 
under A1C(5) and (6) of the Refugee Convention (UNHCR 2003), and a continuing fear of 
                                                          
3 Conversation recorded in field notes, 29th August 2014.  
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persecution persists for many. Describing the Chin in Mizoram as “refugees” is therefore 
consistent with principles of international refugee law if not with Indian policy. However, it is 
also appropriate to recognise that mixed migration movements have been common from 
Myanmar and that this defies blanket categorisation as either a “refugee” or “migrant” 
situation.  
 
I was familiar with Indian refugee policy before beginning my fieldwork but was surprised to 
find that the language of “refugee” was also largely rejected at the local level, by Chin as well 
as Mizos. This would require another article to fully explore, but broadly speaking, among my 
Chin interviewees the label “refugee” was often associated with dependency and the pursuit of 
international assistance (particularly third-country resettlement) and rejection of this label was 
seen as a statement of independence and self-reliance. Mizo interviewees were more likely to 
refer to Indian policy in saying that people from Myanmar in Mizoram are not refugees. 
However, several Mizo interviewees also claimed that the term refugee was inappropriate 
because of a close ethnic relationship: “We are brothers and sisters and one people, one 
nation.”4 These contrasting perspectives speak to a deeper ambiguity about the status of the 
Chin in Mizoram, the nature and implications of which are explored below.  
 
Introducing Mizoram and the Chin 
 
This article analyses relationships between Mizo and Chin as a series of processes of boundary-
creation, boundary-policing and boundary-manipulation. In doing so, it draws on Migdal’s 
(2004) concept of “virtual checkpoints” and “mental maps”. Virtual checkpoints are “sites and 
practices that groups use to differentiate members from others and to enforce separation” (i.e. 
to differentiate insiders and outsiders), while mental maps are constituted by emotional and 
affective processes of defining allegiance. These are socially constructed processes which 
operate to define the parameters of group membership, and the framework captures day-to-day 
practices of boundary policing (virtual checkpoints) as well as an overall vision of belonging 
and difference (mental maps). 
 
The “hasty scrawl of an imperial pen” drew Mizoram into India and the Chin Hills into Burma 
(Khilnani 2004: 31). Yet both groups recognise a common heritage, evidenced in similar 
                                                          
4 Interview, Aizawl, 21st July 2015 
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physical appearance, languages and cultural practices. Mizo history describes migration from 
the Chin Hills, and many Mizo and Chin communities share an origin myth of emerging from 
a cave in Sinlung or Chhinglung (Sakhong 2009; cf Burling 2007). In recent political history 
Mizoram and Chin State have also shared experiences of colonisation, missionisation, conflict 
and insurgency. This has been a porous border for trade and people (Son and Singh 2016). 
From 1966 to 1985, Mizoram was steeped in a bitter insurgency and many sought safety across 
the border in Myanmar. After the Mizo Peace Accord was brokered the movement of people 
was overwhelmingly in the other direction. By the early 2000s, an estimated 100,000 Chin 
were living in Mizoram –10 per cent or more of the State population.  
 
‘Mizo’ and ‘Chin’ are distinct identity categories which share some characteristics and 
overlapping memberships, including the groups known as Lai, Zomi, Lushai/Mizo and 
Lakher/Mara. Full exploration of the construction of Chin and Mizo identity is beyond the 
scope of this article but has been studied by other scholars (e.g. Pachuau 2014; Hluna 2013; 
Robin 2009; Sakhong 2003). Both are identities defined in distinction from their states of 
citizenship, India and Myanmar. Both are composite identities which seek to hold together a 
variety of constituent groups in intensely pluralistic societies.5 Both ‘Mizo’ and ‘Chin’ are also 
contested nomenclatures. Mizo identity is relatively more cohesive, with the identity and a 
common Mizo language recognised throughout the State. Three districts of Mizoram, the Lai, 
Mara and Chakma Autonomous Districts, are governed on the basis of an alternative ethnic 
identity. Here, and among some communities elsewhere in Mizoram, there are efforts to 
encourage ethnic languages, though Mizo remains the lingua franca.  Chin identity is even 
more contested, lacking a common language and a generally accepted common nomenclature. 
I use the label ‘Chin’ to describe people originating from Chin State and those who define 
themselves as Chin from other regions in Myanmar (particularly Sagaing Division). This is 
consistent with the practice of the UNHCR in processing refugee claims from this region. 
However, many people categorised as Chin self-define differently, whether as a more local 
identity, an alternative umbrella identity or both.   
 
Mizoram shares borders with Bangladesh, Myanmar and the Indian states of Tripura, Assam 
and Manipur. ‘Outsider’ populations include migrant workers from mainland India (known 
                                                          
5 In Mizoram, the Indian government recognises 14 ‘scheduled tribes’, while the 1982 Burma Citizenship Law 
recognised ‘ethnic races’, of which 53 are found in Chin State. These categories are politically and 
sociologically contested in both territories but continue to have important bureaucratic and administrative force.  
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locally as vai), undocumented migrants from Bangladesh, and undocumented migrants and 
refugees from Myanmar (predominantly though not exclusively ethnic Chin). Attitudes to these 
populations are relevant to understanding the position of the Chin. Mainland Indians are not 
considered to belong to Mizoram though they share Indian citizenship, as Mizo attitudes to 
mainland Indians are shaped by a total absence of cultural affinity and by the memory of 
cruelties inflicted during the insurgency (Chakraborty 2009). Bangladeshi migrants are not 
considered to belong to Mizoram, despite their shared border, but are both resented and feared, 
with local views shaped by anxieties of “infiltration” (van Schendel 2005: 191-210). In 2018, 
construction will be complete on a 4000km border fence along the Mizoram-Bangladesh 
border, built by the central Indian government but supported by Mizo public opinion (McDuie-
Ra 2014). Even some indigenous communities are excluded from the popularly defined Mizo 
identity, notably Chakma and Bru (Patniak 2008: 81-84), who have experienced rejection and 
expulsion into Bangladesh (Chakma) and Tripura (Bru). Tens of thousands of Bru have been 
living in refugee camps in Tripura since they were forced out of Mizoram in 1997. Attempted 
repatriations failed in 2010 and 2017, as the Bru refused to return without guarantees of their 
safety. Chakma are a sizable ethnic group in Mizoram, recognised as a Scheduled Tribe by the 
Indian government and with a Chakma Autonomous District Council in Mizoram since 1972.  
Nevertheless, there is strong opposition to their presence in Mizoram from the wider Mizo 
population.  
 
Thus, while the territorial border shapes perceptions of belonging it is far from determinative. 
Indeed, among the various ‘outsiders’ mentioned above, only the Chin have a possibility of 
belonging. Proposals to fence the Myanmar border were rejected by the State government and 
Myanmar border residents have freedom to travel within 16km of the border (previously 
40km). The Chin are not Indian citizens but they are often able to acquire documentation 
associated with citizenship, such as a ration card, an electoral identity card or a passport. 
Securing such documentation is widespread in India and beyond, as undocumented immigrant 
populations seek to avoid the risks and dangers of living sans-papiers. As Sadiq (2009) 
recognises, this practice may best be understood as a specific type of citizenship, a 
‘documentary citizenship’ that confers important bureaucratic benefits without necessarily 
implying belonging or acceptance. However, acquiring such documents typically requires 
assistance from within the host population, and the extent to which Chin refugees gain this 
cooperation from Mizo community leaders and others is perhaps where their privileged stake 
to belonging is most apparent.  
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Other practices of belonging are found in shared spaces and places (such as schools, housing 
and church) and in marriage and other relationships. Christianity is an important social force 
in Mizo and Chin communities, and social integration for Chin can be advanced by attending 
Mizo church and participating in the religious life of a locality. Chin children can also attend 
Mizo schools (in contrast to Malaysia, where refugees are denied access to state education). 
Relationships and marriages between Chin and Mizo are relatively common, though I found 
that any problems were attributed to the “mixed” nature of the marriage. For example, several 
Chin women that I interviewed claimed that domestic violence was more common in 
relationships between Chin women and Mizo men, while Mizo interviewees told me that Chin 
women were liable to steal from or abandon a Mizo husband. Such statements imply deep-
seated suspicion and prejudice between the communities; yet the frequency of relationships 
and marriage also demonstrates a proximity between Mizo and Chin which is not apparent 
between Mizo and Bangladeshi migrants or ‘mainland’ Indians.  
 
Indeed, many Mizos feel they have extended generosity to the Chin which has been 
insufficiently recognised, and note that some Chin in Mizoram hold professional jobs and are 
fully integrated within Mizo neighbourhoods, churches etc. This is true for some – and it should 
certainly be recognised that Mizoram is the only destination for Chin refugees that affords any 
opportunity to succeed professionally - but it is not representative of the majority. A typical 
lifestyle for Chin in Mizoram is precarious employment (subsistence trade, domestic workers, 
weavers, agricultural or stone-quarrying), living in a run-down area and socialising primarily 
with other Chin. Chin in Mizoram are also liable to encounter a variety of forms of 
discrimination, ranging from name-calling and insults to labour exploitation  and, on multiple 
occasions over the past twenty years, burning down houses and push-backs to Myanmar (Hre 
Mang 2000; Levesque and Rahman 2008; Human Rights Watch 2009; Basavapatna 2012). In 
these very significant ways, the dominant ‘mental map’ in Mizoram has followed the State’s 
territorial borders to define the Chin as aliens and foreigners.  
 
Boundary Making: virtual checkpoints and the Chin as Other  
 
“People will tell you that there is no problem but actually there is a problem. Burmese 
are looked down on and viewed as inferior. They are associated with negative things, 
they say that ‘nothing good comes from the east but the sun’. If someone is a little ugly 
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they will be described as having a ‘Burmese face’. Crime and social problems are 
attributed to Burmese presence and influence.”  
 
Herzfeld (2005) notes that “nationalism is directly predicated on resemblance […] the pivotal 
idea is that all citizens are, in some unarguable sense, alike”. A corollary to this can be that 
when designated ‘outsiders’ closely resemble the insider community, great efforts are made to 
minimise that resemblance and avoid a claim to belonging, typically by identifying and 
emphasising markers of difference.  These are Migdal’s ‘virtual checkpoints’,  and the 
comment above – from a Mizo woman - indicates some of the most common checkpoints used 
to distinguish Chin from Mizo, including nationality, appearance and perceived criminality. 
The most common Mizo term used to describe Chin is “Burma-mi”. The literal meaning is 
“from Burma” or “Burma-people” but the phrase is laden with other assumptions (of 
inferiority, poverty, stupidity) and is perceived and often intended as an insult. The label of 
Burma-mi is ironic for the Chin, the vast majority of whom reject an identity as “Burmese”. Its 
prevalence in Mizoram underscores the continued importance of the border and the boundary 
between citizen and foreigner in asserting a sense of difference between the two communities.  
 
Virtual checkpoints are also found in names, language, accent and pronunciation, dress, hair 
and physical appearance, i.e. the “tells” used to distinguish a genuine insider from a similar 
outsider. The most significant virtual checkpoint – recognised as such by both Mizos and Chins 
– centres on laws and norms. This is a familiar story, established in a large literature on 
scapegoating and the production of migrant illegality (Dauvergne 2008; de Genova 2004; 
Menjivar and Kanstroom 2014). Rumours and labelling are central processes in defining the 
‘other’, and frequently centre on alleged deviance and criminality to establish an essential 
incompatibility with the host community (Kushner 2006).  
 
Laws of particular concern in Mizoram relate to the sale of alcohol and supply of drugs. 
Between 1995 and 2015, alcohol was entirely prohibited in Mizoram. Prohibition was 
instigated by the Presbyterian Church and though it was legally lifted by the State Government 
in 2015 the Church continues to oppose any use of alcohol. In Chin State, there is no such 
prohibition. Despite Prohibition, alcohol is readily available in Aizawl. Several districts in the 
city are notorious for small-scale alcohol distilleries and the Chin are widely blamed as the 
main operators of these (see further Son and Singh 2016: 362). Drug addiction has been a 
debilitating social problem in Mizoram for more than twenty years, with the source of the 
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addiction moving from heroin to opium to amphetamines and currently an emerging problem 
with methamphetamine. The strongest opposition to Chin presence in Mizoram is based on 
claims that they are responsible for alcohol production and drug-trafficking. In other respects 
too, the Chin in Mizoram are associated with rumours of crime. These include tales of domestic 
workers stealing from home owners, and of the rape of Mizo women by Chin men. Pachuau 
(2014: 193) comments that during her research fieldwork, “All crime in Mizoram, from petty 
theft to gruesome murders, was blamed on the Burmese”, while Basvapatna (2012: 64) remarks 
on “clearly selective” targeting of Chins in policing. My interviews were consistent with this, 
and with the presence of deep-seated distrust of the Chin:  
 
“We say, nothing good comes from the East but the sun.”6  
 
“Every single time there is drug haul and arrests it always will be Myanmarese. […] 
They give themselves a Mizo name but the place they come from is always Tahan or 
somewhere else in Burma. The public perception of these people is, they bring drugs to 
our land, they kill our children. This is why sometimes the host community may be 
reserved or suspicious. […] The degree of crime and kind of crime in the past was 
limited. For past decades after influx they bring all kinds of social crimes.”7 
 
“People here accepted the Burmese, gave them jobs, took them into their homes and 
were repaid with theft and deceit. Their maids who they trusted with their home and 
children sold their goods and ran away. The Burmese brought drugs into the community 
and killed their children.”8  
 
Boundary Policing: enforcing the checkpoints  
 
It has been argued above that the local reception of Chin in Mizoram is shaped by perceptions 
of identity, the boundaries of which are marked by virtual checkpoints which distinguish the 
other (Chin) from the insider (Mizo). Virtual checkpoints are cognitive markers but they 
produce real consequences and are often policed with as much zeal and determination as a 
physical border checkpoint, albeit with different methods. Virtual checkpoints are policed in 
                                                          
6 Interview, Aizawl, 25th August 2014 (this phrase was repeated in several other interviews and conversations).  
7 Interview, Mizoram University, 28th August 2014.  
8 Field notes, 24th August 2014 
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part through gossip, prejudice and the groupthink of ‘popular opinion’. They are also shaped 
by institutions and organisations. A local joke says that there are three governments in 
Mizoram: the State parliament, the Presbyterian Church and the Young Mizo Association 
(YMA). Of the three, the strongest influence on public opinion may well be the YMA, which 
has a membership of 400,000 people (almost half the state population, and the majority of 
adults in the state) and nearly 800 branches state-wide. This gives it influence and weight far 
beyond a conventional community-based organisation. YMA is not the only community-based 
organisation to play such a role (other leading organisations include the Mizoram Upa 
Pawl/Senior Citizens Association and the Mizo Hmeichhe Insuihkhawm Pawl/ Mizo Women’s 
Organisation) but it is the most influential. 
 
Many Mizos view these organisations, and YMA in particular, as an essential part of the Mizo 
social fabric constituted by and constitutive of the trait of tlawmngaihna, an ethos of self-
sacrifice, consideration and care for others. YMA is valued for its work in organising funerals, 
caring for the elderly and rescuing people injured in landslides or swept away by rivers. It is 
an immensely successful community organisation in its practical achievements and a powerful 
example of civil society’s role in the production of identity. However, communitarianism can 
also have a dark side, fostering parochialism, insularity and the exclusion of outsiders. The 
YMA’s role as the primary guardian of Mizo culture has given it a central role in policing the 
boundaries of ‘Mizo-ness’ – and, therefore, in policing the virtual checkpoints between Mizo 
and Chin.  
 
YMA has influenced the lives of Chin in Mizoram in three key areas. First, as the pre-eminent 
community organisation in Mizoram, YMA local branches opposed any parallel organisations 
emerging, which extended to disapproval of attempts by the Chin to develop their own 
organisations. This resistance to parallel organisations was shared by the Presbyterian Church 
in Mizoram, which objected to the establishment of ‘Chin’ churches. This forced Chin 
organisation into a shadowy, illegitimate space and inhibited the development of strong 
community networks. A partial exception existed for women’s groups, of which several were 
formed in the early 2000s though few remain in operation today (Norwood and Zahau 2011).  
 
A second way in which YMA has monitored the “virtual checkpoints” between Chin and Mizo 
has been through local policing. YMA’s activities include an informal policing function and 
local YMA branches will intervene to address, for example, youth misbehaviour or fighting. 
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This function has been most active in relation to alcohol and drugs. YMA typically adopts an 
annual theme to define a priority area. From 2004 until 2009, the theme was ‘Fight Against 
Intoxicants’, and YMA established two policing units: Supply Reduction Service (SRS) and 
Demand Reduction Service (DRS). The policing approach taken by these units relied largely 
on humiliation and intimidation, using beating and public shaming, though this has been 
revised recently to incorporate community service and mediation outcomes. While technically 
a non-discriminatory policing function, YMA members and Chin interviewees agreed that the 
Chin were policed more aggressively than Mizo suspects.  
 
Finally, and most significantly, YMA has on occasion actively organised forced removal of 
Chin from Mizoram (Basavapatna 2012; Human Rights Watch 2009). Chin migration to 
Mizoram began in earnest in the mid-1980s and increased during the early 2000s with a 
combination of worsening political conditions in Myanmar and famine in Chin State. From 
1999 to 2004, YMA’s annual theme reflected anxiety at the influx: ‘Safeguarding Nation and 
Land’ (1999-2002) and ‘Self-Reliance’ (2003-2004). These themes were distilled into anti-
foreigner campaigns and forced returns to Myanmar, which occurred in 2003, 2008 and 2009, 
2010 and 2013. The 2003 campaign was particularly intensive. It occurred after a young girl 
was raped in Aizawl and a Chin man was accused of the crime. In the aftermath, more than 
10,000 Chin were returned to Myanmar. YMA members were at the forefront of these anti-
foreigner campaigns, which were perceived as separating the “good” Chin from the “bad” 
(Basavapatna 2012: 65). A Village Council President interviewed by Pachuau (2014: 194-5) 
commented, “Just as the seed and husk separate on its own while winnowing, similarly, at the 
time of the call for expulsion, all those who know they had to leave, left.”  
 
William Singh has analysed the use of “quit Mizoram” notices as a key tactic in defining and 
imposing a Mizo identity that he argues is intrinsically xenophobic – and indeed, the stance 
that “Mizoram is for the Mizos” has been applied to Indian nationals, Bru and Chakma as well 
as the Chin (Singh 2014; Son and Singh 2016). For the Chin, forced returns to Myanmar have 
been the most extreme manifestation of anti-foreigner mobilisation but they must be 
understood within a wider climate of prejudice and discrimination (Levesque and Rahman 
2008; Human Rights Watch 2009). Some of this remains endemic, a casual discrimination that 
is largely unnoticed by Mizo society but is apparent in jokes, derogatory remarks and a general 
belief of Mizo superiority and Chin inferiority. This behaviour is not as extreme as deportation 
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but it is painful nevertheless. One of my interviewees, a young man in his twenties, described 
the internal conflict of being born and raised in Mizoram as a Chin:  
 
“My mother and father are Chin and I am Chin [… ] I was raised here and in my 
experience I struggled often. I was called “Chin” “Chin boy” often. But I was raised 
in Mizoram, I think of myself as a Mizo boy. The way I speak, act, feel, see, it is like a 
Mizo. I think I am a Mizo guy. Then I realised that Chin is in my blood so why the hell 
call myself a Mizo boy?”9 
 
Boundary Manipulation: redrawing the boundaries 
 
So far this article has told a familiar story, of opposition to a refugee influx manifested in the 
creation and policing of boundaries between those who belong in Mizoram and those who do 
not. Resentment of the Chin appears to be driven by a variety of ‘fears of the other’, including 
a fear of domination by an outsider population that is shared by other north-eastern territories 
and is particularly acute in relation to Bangladeshi migrants, Indian mainland workers and 
Muslim migrants (Son and Singh 2016; Singh 2014; Basavapatna 2012; Human Rights Watch 
2009; Levesque and Rahman 2008). Other fears include the risk of fostering disunity in 
Mizoram and weakening the society through moral and cultural deterioration or by ‘catching’ 
Myanmar’s political and economic instability.   
 
However, there is a counterpoint to this refrain which draws the boundaries of identity and 
territorial belonging rather differently and recognises the Chin and Mizo as related ethnic 
communities existing in a shared ancestral territory. This can be seen as part of a wider inquiry 
into the history of Mizos which is challenging colonial-era narratives of Mizo identity and 
origin (Pachuau 2014; Piang 2013; Dena 2013; Zama 2006; Hluna 2013; Thantungnung 2015). 
In Chin-Mizo relations, this has often been tied to identity discourses and the assertion of a 
pan-ethnic identity which emphasises the shared cultural origins of the two communities. Pan-
ethnic identities have been asserted under various labels (such as Zo, Mizo, Lai and Kuki), each 
representing different parameters of kinship. The most influential pan-identity movement in 
Mizoram is Zo, which incorporates those groups currently categorised as Chin, Mizo and Kuki 
and therefore includes residents of Mizoram, Chin State and Sagaing Division in Myanmar; 
                                                          
9 Interview with members of a Chin church, Aizawl, 25th July 2015.  
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Assam, Manipur, Nagaland and Tripura in India; and the Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh. 
Zo is one of several similar identity movements in the Northeast India, which have variously 
been described as “cosmopolitan identities”, “micro-nationalisms” and “adjacent identities” 
(D. Zou 2010; S. Zou 2012; McDuie-Ra 2015). These identity movements reject the sovereign 
and territorial nationalism of India and Myanmar in favour of an identity-based ethno-
nationalism. In effect, they are postcolonial identity movements linked to conceptions of 
precolonial ethnic unity. Some of this work arguably presents an idealised harmonious and 
egalitarian past, but the central idea of a pan-ethnic identity has had considerable impact.  
 
Zo identity is not a recent invention (Vumson 1986; Son-Doerschel 2013). Nevertheless, its 
influence as a modern identity movement in Mizoram might be dated to 1991 and the decision 
of the Zo Reunification Organisation (ZORO) to establish a “non-political, ethnic-based 
organisation” for all Zo, “so that political boundary would not be a hindrance” (Thangmawia 
2013: 3). ZORO sought to engage international frameworks of indigenous rights, eventually 
securing recognition by the United Nations and participation in UN mechanisms as an 
indigenous population of Zo (see e.g. ZORO 2015). ZORO initially had little mainstream 
support but has gained greater acceptance in its own right and catalysed other organisations to 
work under a similar premise, including Zo Indigenous Forum and Zofa Global Network. Some 
of these organisations have also undertaken international advocacy, but their primary focus has 
been more local, with particular emphasis on cross-border gatherings. For example, ZoFest is 
organised by Mizoram’s MZP student union as a gathering of Zo from Mizoram, Manipur, 
Tripura, Chittagong Hill Tracts and Chin State.  ZoFest was first held in 2002 in Manipur and 
regularly thereafter in Mizoram and other locations - but never Myanmar.  It was significant, 
therefore, that Myanmar’s second student union (MSU) organised a ‘Chhinlung Cultural 
Festival’ in Chin State in 2014.  
 
These events and many others have emphasised themes of brotherhood, ethnic unity and 
kinship, of Mizo and Chin as Zofate (children of Zo) and Zo hnahthlak (Zo brothers). This 
suggests a changing understanding of boundaries and belonging, which has been instigated by 
residents of Mizoram (both Mizo and Chin) and by Chin diaspora. Over the past twenty years, 
many Chin refugees in New Delhi and Malaysia have been resettled to ‘third countries’, 
typically the United States and Australia. This has established the Chin as a transnational 
community with considerable political status, and a diasporic elite has sought to raise 
awareness about conditions for the Chin through human rights monitoring and lobbying (see 
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e.g. CHRO 2012; Seeking Refuge 2011) and more diffuse strategies of political engagement. 
Mizo public opinion is profoundly shaped by internal elites, including singers and musicians, 
journalists and media commentators. The Chin diaspora has made calculated appeals to these 
sectors by, for example, inviting Mizo singers to perform at concerts for resettled Chin 
communities in the USA. These concerts offer entertainment by hugely popular musicians such 
as Mami Varte (who performed in a US tour organised by the Chin Youth Organisation in 
2013). However, they have also served a public relations agenda, to counter Mizo perceptions 
of the Chin as deviant and destitute.  
 
Interest in Myanmar has also been fostered by Mizo media outlets which produced news stories 
and TV documentaries discussing Myanmar’s art and culture, natural resources, and wealthy 
cities of Yangon and Mandalay. This rich history of power and status has been a revelation to 
many Mizos, more familiar with Myanmar as a failed state than the ‘rice basket of Asia’. An 
influential documentary about Chin State emphasised similarities between Chin and Mizo, such 
as shared cultures of hospitality and generosity. This was an explicit attempt to build better 
relations, as its producer explained:  
 
“My role as a Mizo is to introduce Chin State to the people here in Mizoram. People in 
Aizawl totally don’t know about their neighbours […] we think of them as primitive [...] 
When the documentary was broadcast the impact was beyond my imagination.”10  
 
One result has been to make Myanmar a country of interest for Mizos, even a tourist 
destination:  
 
“For past decades, Mizos have always looked west. Now they are starting to be 
interested in what is east.”11 
 
It is impossible to quantify the impact of these attempts to shape perceptions of the Chin. 
However, many of my interviewees felt that conditions had improved in recent years and cited 
less name-calling, fairer treatment by employers and no recent push-backs across the border.12 
                                                          
10 Interview, Aizawl, 28th July 2015.  
11 Interview, Aizawl, 28th July 2015.  
12 E.g. interview with Chin teacher, Aizawl 15th July 2015; Chin tea seller, Aizawl, 22nd July 2015; Chin woman 
vegetable seller Lawngtlai, 5th August 2015.    
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They attributed these changes in part to better understanding of Myanmar and the Chin. An 
illustration of this apparent change of heart came during my fieldwork in 2015, when monsoon 
rains caused landslides in Chin State which destroyed hundreds of houses, left thousands of 
people homeless and blocked road access. Mizoram embarked on a massive fund-raising drive, 
from the state’s Chief Minister (who requested the Indian Government to provide aid and 
proposed Mizoram as a base for helicopter aid deliveries) to student unions (who asked their 
members to donate one day’s lunch money). The Young Mizo Association sent trucks loaded 
with rice to Chin State. Churches prayed, fasted and collected hundreds of thousands of rupees 
in donations. Mizo singers and celebrities organised a TV charity concert and a three-day event 
at Aizawl’s central shopping mall. Many organising the relief events had never previously 
supported the Chin - and in some cases, had been the key ringleaders encouraging their 
rejection. A language of co-ethnicity and kinship was prominent during these fundraising 
efforts, which consistently described the beneficiaries as “our brothers and sisters in Burma”, 
suggesting an important labelling shift from foreigner (Burma-mi) to kin (Zo hnahthlak and 
Zofate). This in turn suggested that a message that was unpalatable to many Mizos even twenty 
years ago – the essential similarity of Mizo and Chin – had been embraced not merely by a 
fringe of society but by mainstream opinion formers such as the Presbyterian Church and the 
YMA. 
 
However, the long-term implications of this pan-ethnic identity movement are more complex. 
By emphasising kinship between groups currently resident in several territories of India and 
Myanmar, Zo identity implies redefined geographical borders. There is limited support in 
Mizoram or Chin State for a secessionist movement to establish a ‘Zoram’, but the symbolic 
recognition of such a territory is at the heart of events such as ZoFest. Some Mizos fear that 
this is a political agenda that in the worst case scenario may lead to political violence and 
jeopardise Mizoram’s hard-won stability. Others are concerned with distribution of resources 
and the risk of dilution of Mizo identity. Still others see it as short-sighted political opportunism 
from groups that seek to benefit from Chin political support:   
 
“Students, YMA, political parties: when it suits political purposes they are our 
brothers; when it doesn’t, they are outsiders […] People are illegal but political parties 
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want their votes. They make promises. These people are valuable vote-banks. All of the 
parties do that.”13  
 
Among Chin in Mizoram, a converse fear prevails: that ‘Zo’ identity is indistinguishable from 
Mizo identity, and therefore that greater ethnic belonging with Mizos will diminish or eradicate 
other identities. Zo identity scholars describe it as universally accepted by Chin (e.g. Son 2013, 
Son 2014) but many of my Chin interviewees in Mizoram and elsewhere disagreed. They were 
concerned that Zo identity was assimilationist and had become the most acceptable pan-ethnic 
identity movement in Mizoram precisely because it accepted the Chin as an extension of Mizo 
identity rather than as a threat to that identity:  
 
“Mizos want to assimilate other groups. Even ZORO, their idea of integration is 
assimilation: that Zo – which is Mizo – will be the term and that Mizo will be the 
common language.”14  
 
“Chin people cannot accept to be called Mizo, and the Mizo people will never accept 
to be called Chin.”15  
 
My Chin interviewees did not necessarily consider Zo identity as a desirable ideology but did 
think that it had influenced Mizo perceptions of Chin. This suggests that appropriately targeted 
interventions can help to influence public opinion, which is a hopeful finding for refugee 
reception generally. However, even those who believed that prejudice against the Chin had 
reduced were not convinced that this represented enduring change:  
 
“Compared to 2000 and 2003 [times of violent removal of Chin from Mizoram], the 
situation is totally different now. Mizos have opened their eyes, they care about human 
rights and about international perception”16 
  
“We will see. The next time that there is a serious crime, a rape or a murder, it will all 
be forgotten.”17  
                                                          
13 Interview, Mizoram University, 28th August 2014.  
14 Interview, Lawngtlai 3rd August 2015.  
15  Interview, Aizawl, 18th August 2015.  
16 Interview, Aizawl, 15th July 2015.  
17 Interview, Aizawl, 24th July 2015. 
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“Mizo people understand a bit more about Burma so the situation is a bit better but 
that could change again. They still consider us bad people.”18  
 
Support for the view that tolerance of the Chin was conditional and provisional rather than 
principled and lasting came in 2016 (when YMA demanded the removal of Chin from Mual 
Khang village who were alleged to have been brewing alcohol) and again in 2017 when 
violence in Myanmar’s Rakhine State sent hundreds of Chin to seek safety in Mizoram. 
Arrivals in May 2017 were immediately returned “to avert a major refugee crisis that could 
have lingered in Mizoram”. Months later, renewed fighting forced a further 1600 Chin to flee 
to Mizoram’s Lai Autonomous District. Initial reports quoted the district police chief’s 
statement that “we would not push back the refugees due to humanitarian grounds. The people 
who crossed over to Mizoram were mostly Buddhists and Christians and they speak the same 
tribal language as the locals” (New Indian Express 2017).  Soon after, repatriation plans were 
announced. When this was attempted in January 2018, more than 1400 refugees refused to 
return.  
 
Similarly, even as the virtual checkpoints have been less rigorously policed for (some) Chin in 
Mizoram, they have escalated for other perceived ‘outsiders’. Proposals to repatriate Bru 
refugees forced from Mizoram in 1997 are actively resisted, even (perhaps especially) by 
organisations and individuals who have promoted Mizo-Chin unity. Anti-Chakma activism has 
also escalated, even though Chakmas have a legally recognised autonomous district in 
Mizoram. In 2017, a political proposal sought to eject all Chakma born in Mizoram after 1950, 
and leading Mizo community organisations organised a large protest in New Delhi against 
illegal immigration in Mizoram, explicitly targeting Chakma (Newmai News Network 2017, 
Chakma Social Forum 2017). Mizo community organisations have also campaigned to 
intensify policing along the Mizoram-Bangladesh border (Khojol 2017). The Chin have not 
been targeted in this latest round of anti-foreigner activism. During my fieldwork, a Zo activist 
said that he had initially worked under a human rights rubric but no longer defined his work 
this way “because human rights requires us to provide the same services to everyone and I want 
to prioritise our community, our people.”19 He included the Chin within this ambit but 
                                                          
18 Interview, Aizawl, 25th July 2015.   
19 Interview, Aizawl 21st July 2015.  
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explicitly excluded Bru and Chakma: “all that we have in common, the only thing that we have 
in common, is that we are human beings”. He did not consider this shared humanity sufficient 
justification for Bru and Chakma to live in Mizoram.  
 
This suggests an important conclusion regarding overlapping identities or intersectionality. 
Defining “belonging” and an entitlement to belong is a process that ascribes value to different 
identities, and that value can shift over time (e.g. Madsen and Van Naerssen 2003; Fincham 
2012). However, identities are multiple and overlapping.  Refugee studies as a disciplinary 
field has prioritised refugee identity as an analytic category. However, refugees are also 
individuals who exist within multiple communities of belonging, potentially related to (e.g.) 
national, ethnic, racial, religious, gender and sexual identities. The experience of Chin and 
others in Mizoram suggests that it is these identities that are most influential in defining the 
boundaries between insiders/outsiders – and therefore where there is greatest space for 
redrawing those boundaries to encourage or enhance belonging.  
 
Where Chin have been accepted as having a claim to ‘belong’ in Mizoram, it has been on the 
basis of a shared ethnic identity, shared religion and similar culture and language. These 
commonalities have been permitted to prevail over the difference of nationality. In contrast, 
the Bru and Chakma are not accepted as Mizo: differences of faith and culture outweigh the 
connections of shared territory, nationality and citizenship. A further example is provided by 
Raheja (this issue) in relation to Pakistani Hindus in northern India, where shared religion 
cannot redeem in local eyes the fatal flaw of Pakistani nationality. These examples suggest the 
importance for refugee studies in paying greater attention to intersectional identities, to better 
understand the weight and value attributed to different identities - and therefore to understand, 
predict (and perhaps even alter) perceptions of refugees by host communities.  
 
Conclusion  
 
This article has argued that the local reception of Chin refugees in Mizoram is shaped by 
perceptions of belonging, which can be understood in relation to a “mental map” of affiliations 
and “virtual checkpoints” of difference. It has noted that while Mizo and Chin identity 
discourses reject identification as Indian or Burmese, negative perceptions of the Chin in 
Mizoram have been reinforced by virtual checkpoints which essentially reconstitute the Indian 
border. Those virtual checkpoints facilitate processes of boundary policing which have 
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manifested in discrimination, prejudice and forced removals from Mizoram. However there 
has also been an alternate discourse of kinship, co-ethnicity and brotherhood, often expressed 
through Zo identity. These discourses of othering and brotherhood coexist but have taken the 
ascendance at different points. The important question therefore becomes when and where each 
has been deployed, and what that might tell us about the factors shaping ‘boundaries and 
belonging’ for Chin in Mizoram.  
 
Mizo opposition to the Chin has been strongest when identity is defined in terms of national 
borders: i.e. Mizos are from Mizoram and Chin are Burmese (Burma-mi). In contrast, 
acceptance of Chin has been strongest when identity is defined in accordance with ethnicity: 
i.e. when Mizo and Chin are understood as co-ethnics. Empathy for Chin refugees has been 
influenced by deliberate efforts from Mizo and Chin alike to reshape the boundaries of identity 
and establish a more inclusive approach to ethnicity. This is a reminder that cartographic lines 
do not dictate mental maps of belonging, hospitality and acceptance. Similarly, analyses of 
integration and immigration typically place national laws and policies at the centre, but these 
are not the most important influences in every refugee situation – and certainly not in Mizoram, 
where reception of the Chin and others has been dictated by local community organisations 
rather than Indian Government or Mizoram State policies, and where claims for entitlement to 
protection have been made not on the basis of their status as refugees but as members of a 
common ethnic and cultural heritage. This underscores the importance of contextualising 
refugee reception in terms of refugees’ multiple identities and in terms of the wide range of 
political, economic, social and cultural factors that influence the construction of boundaries 
and belonging.  
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